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Editors’ note: From October 2015 through 
June 2016, two insightful colleagues (Ma-
ria Bonn and Nancy Sims) will share their 
thoughts while they navigate the ever-chang-
ing landscape of scholarly communication. 
Each will contribute two columns on differ-
ent topics. This month’s column is Sims’s 
first, which sheds light on the copyright 
issues about different versions of a published 
scholarly work. 
Green” open access—sharing copies of published scholarship online via reposi-
tories, rather than in the place of original 
publication—can be an appealing option 
for scholarly authors. It’s largely within their 
own control, and also often the option with 
least personal financial cost. Many publishers 
have standing policies enabling green open 
access of some kind, but the specifics of 
these policies vary widely and can be quite 
confusing for authors and others trying to 
understand and comply.
One of the major points of variation is 
which version of a published piece can be 
shared—the formatted version distributed 
by the publisher, the final manuscript sub-
sequent to editing and review, or the manu-
script version submitted by the author prior 
to review and editing. Early manuscripts are 
mostly of interest during the development 
of the piece, and are often not particularly 
relevant to the interests of either readers or 
authors once a piece has been edited and 
“finished.” Many readers may be quite happy 
with an open copy of the final edited manu-
script, since it contains the same content as 
the finished article. But for authors, the final 
formatted publication may be preferred for 
a number of reasons. 
For one thing, manuscript copies can be 
hard to locate. For another, it may be harder 
for subsequent users to cite manuscript cop-
ies in ways in which the citations are easily 
tracked back to the author. Since citation 
counts can be relevant to future employer 
and funder evaluations, this can be a fairly 
important consideration. These “version” 
distinctions have real effects as far as mak-
ing open access “work” for authors and 
their potential readers, so it’s important to 
understand their origin and impact. There 
seems to be widespread belief among au-
thors, library folks, and even some publisher 
representatives that these variations have to 
do with different copyrights in the various 
versions. This is almost entirely untrue. The 
distinctions are largely arbitrary.
“The copyright” in a work developed over 
time is a complicated concept. Under U.S. 
law (and the law of the majority of other 
countries), a copyright arises at the moment 
of creation of a work of authorship—in the 
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United States, “[a] work is ‘created’ when it 
is fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the 
first time.”1 
Practically speaking, though, many works 
(likely most scholarly works) are created 
through iterative processes involving mul-
tiple drafts, formal and informal review 
processes, significant editing, and revision. 
This usually takes months; sometimes years. 
The law does anticipate this kind of devel-
opment over time—U.S. law says that “. . . 
where a work is prepared over a period of 
time, the portion of it that has been fixed at 
any particular time constitutes the work as 
of that time, and where the work has been 
prepared in different versions, each version 
constitutes a separate work.”2 But what does 
all this legal stuff mean in practice? 
One thing is clear, there is no difference 
in “the copyright” in an unformatted manu-
script and “the copyright” in that same text 
formatted for publication. In order to see 
why this is so clear, it may help to have a 
more robust understanding of some copy-
right theory: What gives rise to the existence 
of a copyright? Under U.S. law, copyright 
arises from the original expression of a 
creator and protects only that creator’s ex-
pression, not any facts or ideas that underlie 
the expression.3 
Just a few of the many legal opinions that 
have explored these concepts can illustrate 
the basics. The widely persuasive opinion 
in Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel addressed 
whether a reproduction of an already exist-
ing work can have its own copyright. That 
court held that despite the work involved 
in creating photographic reproductions of 
paintings, there was no new expression in 
new photographs that were accurate repro-
ductions, and thus no new copyright. Since 
the paintings in question in that case were 
in the public domain, “slavish copy” photos 
were also in the public domain.4 
But even after the Bridgeman decision, 
other courts have found that reproductions 
of existing works that include new creative 
expression (such as a photograph of a 
sculpture that reflects expressive choices in 
angle, lighting, focus, etc.) can have a new 
copyright. These decisions are applying a 
much older Supreme Court case, Burrow-
Giles v. Sarony. That case arose in the very 
early days of photography, when people 
disagreed about whether photographs, as 
images produced by machines, could be 
considered works of authorship in the sense 
needed to give rise to a copyright. The court 
ruled that photographs could be works of 
authorship eligible for copyright, due to 
expressive choices the photographer made 
in composing the image; posing the subject; 
choosing clothing, props, set dressing, and 
lighting; and so on.5 That’s one basic: new 
expression, new copyright; no new expres-
sion, no new copyright.
In U.S. law, effort alone is not enough 
to give rise to a copyright. It’s possible to 
invest quite a bit of effort and still produce 
something uncopyrightable. The most 
important decision on this point is Feist 
Publications v. Rural Telephone, in which 
the Supreme Court considered whether the 
work of collecting and compiling factual 
information could give rise to a copyright. 
They determined both that arrangements of 
factual information exhibiting “at least some 
minimal degree of creativity” could give rise 
to a copyright, but that a standard telephone 
directory did not reflect that level of creativ-
ity, however much effort was required to 
produce it.6 
Sometimes, a creator of a work may 
invest a lot of effort to make many choices, 
and still not produce anything copyrightable. 
If the choices are not creative, but rather 
dictated by functional considerations, there 
is still not enough original expression for a 
new copyright. Some of the most interesting 
test cases on these points are specifically 
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about shifting text content from one format 
to another: West Publishing has gone to 
court a couple of times to prevent copying 
of the way it reports U.S. court opinions. In 
no case has anyone ruled that West does not 
have a copyright in the new analysis it adds 
to court opinions—this is clearly original 
expression. 
But West has at various times claimed 
that the choices it makes to systematize 
things, like attorney and court names, to 
standardize docket numbers and citations 
and their resulting pagination, are expressive 
choices that give rise to a copyright. This 
argument has been solidly rejected.7 The 
Second Circuit ruled that the only choices 
that give rise to a copyright are “subjective 
judgments relating to taste and value that 
were not obvious and that were not dictated 
by industry convention.”8 Thus, competi-
tors (and public information websites) can 
copy all of the uncopyrightable material in 
a West-published court opinion, but they 
cannot copy the copyrightable analysis and 
annotations that West adds. 
With that background, it’s clear that “the 
copyright” in a journal article or other schol-
arly publication arises from the creative, 
original, expressive choices made by the 
author (or authors) in the course of writing. 
Editorial and reviewer’s input may influence 
author choices, but still, the resulting copy-
rightable work is the text of the article. Pre-
paring an article for publication may involve 
choices such as font size, column formatting, 
pagination, and so on, but those choices will 
usually be dictated by the standards of the 
journal and industry conventions, none of 
which are original expression that gives rise 
to a new or separate copyright. 
But even with that background, another 
question remains. Is it possible that some-
times there are earlier versions of an article 
that are not affected by a copyright transfer 
agreement? 
The law I quoted earlier, about works 
developed over time, mentions that the “por-
tion of it that has been fixed at any particular 
time constitutes the work as of that time, 
and where the work has been prepared in 
different versions, each version constitutes 
a separate work.”9 Unpacking that statutory 
language a bit, it definitely does suggest that 
different versions of a work may have differ-
ent copyrights. But it also suggests that there 
may be a unitary work that exists at different 
times—“the work as of that time.” One work 
may, over time, have different drafts that are 
basically the same work, or different drafts 
that are different works. 
Most of the cases where courts consider 
whether two works are “the same” or “dif-
ferent” are cases where they are trying to 
determine whether one work infringes on 
another. Courts usually use the “substantial 
similarity” test to determine whether a later 
work infringes.10 There can be significant 
technicalities to the determination of sub-
stantial similarity, depending on the nature 
of the work (computer programs have 
multiple levels of comparison), and specific 
facts like whether the alleged infringer can 
be proven to have read (or seen, or heard, 
or used) the previous work. But ultimately 
the idea boils down to this: Where works 
are too similar, the later work contains too 
much expression present in the earlier work, 
so it infringes. Works that are not substan-
tially similar contain separate copyrightable 
expression.
Cases about ownership of serial fic-
tion are one of the few recurrent kinds of 
cases that address the internal differences 
of a work (or related works) created over 
time. A recent case about ownership of the 
Sherlock Holmes character reflects many of 
the baseline issues. In this case, the Conan 
Doyle estate argued that, since quite a few 
Holmes stories were published after 1923 (an 
important cut-off year for the public domain 
status in the United States), the standing 
copyright in those later stories gave them 
ownership and control over all uses of the 
character and related settings. 
Instead, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a 
lower court’s ruling that any distinguishable 
elements, including characters, settings, and 
character traits, established in stories that are 
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in the public domain, are free for anyone to 
use. Only the elements of the character newly 
established in later stories are covered by the 
later copyrights.11 
One might conclude from the Sherlock 
Holmes case that the transfer of “the copy-
right” in an article only affects the parts of 
the article established at the very end of 
the development process—perhaps just the 
changes following review feedback. But keep 
in mind that the Holmes case was determin-
ing which elements of the characters were in 
the public domain, and which were added 
subsequently. The copyright in a character, 
and the copyright in a written work, are quite 
different things. In fact, some characters are 
not original enough to even have a standalone 
copyright. A character can, so to speak, stand 
on his or her own. 
In the case of a scholarly work, elements 
that are severable from the overall narrative 
may function similarly to elements of a char-
acter. If an element can be separated from 
the rest of the written work, and does not 
appear in versions in which the copyright is 
transferred, the transfer of copyright in “the 
work” may not affect that element. But it is 
likely that transferring “the copyright” in a fi-
nal edited manuscript also transfers copyright 
in any previous version that is substantially 
similar to that manuscript. It’s not easy to de-
termine where the line of “substantial similar-
ity” lies. It’s possible that early drafts of some 
works are so dissimilar to the final version 
that they have separate copyrights. But if an 
author has transferred away the copyright for 
a work they want to make more available, 
they probably won’t find it very satisfying to 
hear that the only copyright they still control 
is to the elements of the work entirely unlike 
the final version. 
Whoever owns “the copyright” in an article 
or other scholarly work owns “the copyright” 
in both the final manuscript and the ver-
sions formatted for print or online publica-
tion. Authors who completely transfer their 
copyrights may retain the ability to distribute 
some versions of their work, but primarily via 
publisher policies that are subject to change 
at the publisher’s discretion. Any particular 
right of use that is important to an author 
should be explicitly addressed in the publi-
cation contract. Contracts provide expansive 
opportunities to create new legal constructs 
that meet the specific needs and wants of 
individual authors and publishers,  which is 
convenient since “the copyright” in a work is 
a legal construct complex enough to make 
anyone’s head spin. 
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